

INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

February 6, 2020
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TO: The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: Chief of Police

SUBJECT: UNINTENTIONAL DISCHARGE (NON-TACTICAL) FID NO. 014-19

Honorable Members:

The following is my review, analysis, and findings for Unintentional Discharge (UD), Force Investigation Division (FID) No. 014-19. A Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) was convened on this matter on January 13, 2020. I have reviewed and adopted the recommendations from the UOFRB for this incident. I hereby submit my findings in accordance with Police Commission policy.

SUMMARY¹

On April 16, 2019, Officer W. Sampson, Serial No. 43662, Van Nuys Patrol Division, was off-duty inside his apartment residence located in the City of Hacienda Heights. He was assigned to Watch Three patrol and had worked the night prior.

According to Officer Sampson, he worked from *1915 to 0715 in the morning* and went to sleep in his residence at approximately 1100 hours. He awoke at approximately 2045 hours where he joined his wife, Jazmin Sampson, and their three children for dinner inside their residence.² Officer Sampson stated he was going to walk to the *nearby 7-Eleven to get something to drink for everyone*. Prior to leaving, Officer Sampson decided he was going to take his *off-duty weapon*. He retrieved his off-duty pistol, a Smith and Wesson 9mm Shield, which was located in a *safe box with a combination lock* in his bedroom and *loaded it*.³ He placed the pistol into his right front pants *zipper* pocket, without a holster. Officer Sampson's *debit card, police identification, and keys* were also placed into the same pocket as his pistol. Officer Sampson exited his residence (**Additional Tactical Debrief Topics- Utilization of a Holster, Approved Duty Ammunition and Ammunition Loading Standards**).

¹ The summary and the investigation completed by FID for this incident have been provided to the Board of Police Commissioners.

² As there are two persons in this report with the surname of Sampson, for clarity, Jazmin Sampson will be referred to as "Jazmin."

³ The FID investigation determined that the pistol was loaded with a mixture of ball practice and factory duty ammunition at the time of the Non-Tactical Unintentional Discharge (NTUD). The pistol's full capacity was eight rounds in the magazine, with one round in the chamber. The pistol was not loaded to full capacity (loaded with a total of eight rounds) and was not secured in a holster.

The FID investigation determined that according to Officer Sampson, he had a holster for his off-duty pistol, but it was stored inside of his personally owned vehicle. He rarely carried the pistol, except for situations such as going to the store. Officer Sampson stated that he did not carry his off-duty pistol while he is on-duty.

According to Officer Sampson, he returned to his residence from the store approximately *10 minutes* later. The children had finished eating dinner and they were *put into bed* in their bedroom.⁴ Officer Sampson sat in the living room *recliner* to watch television while Jazmin sat on the living room sofa which faced the recliner. Jazmin was *watching a show* on her *cell phone* while wearing headphones.

According to Jazmin, Officer Sampson had purchased *cranberry juice* from the store. The FID investigation indicated that Officer Sampson's blood screening results for alcohol were negative.

According to Officer Sampson, he was going to put his pistol away and attempted to remove the pistol from his *right-side pants pocket* while he was *sitting in the recliner chair*. He *leaned back*, lifted and stretched *his left leg out*, and reached into his pocket using his right hand to remove the pistol. As Officer Sampson began to remove the pistol from his pocket, he *pulled the trigger, unintentionally striking himself in the left leg*, resulting in a Non-Tactical Unintentional Discharge (NTUD). Officer Sampson believed he had placed his finger on the pistol's trigger due to *a lack of respect for the weapon and not being focused*. Officer Sampson acknowledged he was at *fault* and felt it was *something that could have been prevented*. Officer Sampson did not believe that there was a malfunction of any sort with the pistol (**Unintentional Discharge and Debriefing Point – Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules**).

Note: According to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's (LASD) Accidental Shooting with Injuries Report, File No. 919-04966-146-486, Officer Sampson stated he had held the pistol in his left hand.

According to Officer Sampson, the information the deputies had documented was inaccurate. Officer Sampson was *right hand dominant* and the pistol was in his *right hand*, pointed down towards his *left thigh* when he *discharged* it. Officer Sampson did not recall speaking to the LASD deputies at the time of the incident and believed he was in *shock and pain* immediately following the incident.

According to the FID investigation, the bullet struck Officer Sampson in the left leg, just above the knee. The bullet did not exit and remained in Sampson's left calf area.

According to Jazmin, she was looking down at her cellphone when she heard a *loud boom* which caused her *left ear* to *ring*. She saw Officer Sampson stand and she asked him what had happened.

⁴ The FID investigation determined the children were in their bedroom with the door closed and did not witness the NTUD. According to Officer Sampson, his children had been in bed approximately 20 minutes prior to the NTUD.

According to Officer Sampson, he told his wife Jazmin that he had *shot* himself and to *call 9-1-1*. He then *placed* the pistol in the laundry basket which was in front of the recliner. Officer Sampson *stood up* and *walked toward the door* where he *laid down* adjacent to the dining table. Officer Sampson decided to lay down on the floor because the *blood just started coming out way too much* while Jazmin applied pressure to the wound, as she was instructed to do so by the 9-1-1 operator. As he waited for paramedics to arrive, he telephonically notified the watch commander, Lieutenant M. Martinez, Serial No. 27419, Van Nuys Patrol Division, who advised Officer Sampson that someone would respond to investigate the incident (**Command and Control**).

According to the FID investigation, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's Industry Station Deputies R. Mendoza, Serial No. 518617, and S. Pombal, Serial No. 616643, arrived at scene. Deputy Pombal placed a tourniquet on Officer Sampson's left leg to prevent further blood loss. Deputy Mendoza located the pistol laying in the laundry basket in the living room. He rendered the firearm safe by removing a round from the chamber, removing the magazine from the pistol, and locking the slide to the rear. Deputy Mendoza returned the pistol to the laundry basket where he had found it. Officer Sampson was transported by Care Ambulance Service to Pomona Valley Medical Center (PVMC) where he was treated for a single gunshot wound resulting in a non-life threatening injury.⁵

According to Captain O. Chandler, Serial No. 26288, Commanding Officer, Van Nuys Patrol Division, Lieutenant Martinez and Detective II J. Briscoe, Serial No. 34320, Van Nuys Area, responded to PVMC together.⁶ Lieutenant Martinez assumed command and control as the Incident Commander (IC) and located Officer Sampson. Officer Sampson was heavily sedated and unable to effectively communicate with either supervisor; therefore, no Public Safety Statement (PSS) was obtained. Officer Sampson was separated and monitored by Lieutenant Martinez and Detective Briscoe until FID personnel arrived to conduct their investigation (**Command and Control, Additional – Categorical Use of Force Protocols**).

The FID investigation located a paper shooting target on the living room wall. According to Officer Sampson, the target was placed on the wall while he was attending the Academy because he *struggled with firearms* and had to complete a *second attempt* at *combat shooting*. Officer Sampson used the paper target in conjunction with an empty pistol to practice aiming and pressing the trigger. The FID investigation determined that the paper target was not a factor in the NTUD.

Note: According to his wife Jazmin, Officer Sampson hung the paper target on the wall when Officer Sampson was attending the Academy because he was having trouble qualifying with the *shotgun*.

⁵ Officer Sampson's injury resulted in an additional six surgeries and he was hospitalized for an approximate two week period.

⁶ Intradepartmental Correspondence, dated April 18, 2019, from the Commanding Officer, Van Nuys Area, to the Commanding Officer, FID, documenting the separation, monitoring, and PSS for Officer Sampson.

The FID investigation revealed no evidence or history of domestic violence involving Officer Sampson. The investigation also revealed no evidence of Officer Sampson suffering from depression, having personal issues related to anger, or having consumed alcohol prior to the NTUD.

On May 21, 2019, Officer Sampson's pistol was test fired by Criminalist B. Reinarz, Serial No. N5624, Forensic Science Division. The pistol tested as functioning as designed with a trigger pull value that was within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Armory's established acceptable range

FINDINGS

Tactics – Tactical Debrief, Officer Sampson.

Drawing/Exhibiting – Does Not Apply.

Unintentional Discharge – Administrative Disapproval, Negligent Discharge, Officer Sampson.

ANALYSIS⁸

Detention

Does not apply.

Tactics

Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *“The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance” (LAPD Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

Officer Sampson's tactics were not related to the NTUD that occurred during this incident; therefore, they were not reviewed or evaluated. However, as Department guidelines require personnel who are substantially involved in a Categorical Use of Force incident attend a Tactical Debrief, I have determined that it would be appropriate to recommend a Tactics finding of Tactical Debrief.

During the review of this incident, the following Debriefing Point was noted:

- Firearms Manipulations – Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules

⁸The analysis reflects my recommendations as supported by the preponderance of the evidence established by the investigation.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

Utilization of a Holster - Officer Sampson placed his loaded pistol into his right-front pants pocket without securing it in a holster. While the pistol was concealed, it was not contained in a manner to prevent the pistol from falling out or becoming accessible to unauthorized persons. This same pocket also contained additional items, including his debit card, police ID, and keys. These items could have hindered his immediate access to the firearm. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Approved Duty Ammunition - Officer Sampson's weapon had been loaded with a mixture of ball practice ammunition and factory duty ammunition. According to Officer Sampson, he had two additional factory duty rounds left over from his last re-qualification attempt and added them into this pistol's magazine, which had contained ball practice ammunition, resulting in mixed ammunition. The ball practice ammunition was not approved by the Department for off-duty use. Officer Sampson acknowledged that this was an incorrect loading procedure. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Ammunition Loading Standards – Officer Sampson believed that his pistol had been loaded to full capacity, with a full magazine and one additional round in the chamber. The FID post incident firearm/magazine inspection revealed that Officer Sampson's pistol was not filled to capacity prior to the NTUD. The pistol's capacity was a maximum of nine rounds, including one in the chamber (full magazine of eight rounds, with an additional round in the chamber of the pistol). FID investigators recovered six live rounds of ball practice ammunition not authorized by the Department for on duty/off-duty use, and one Department-authorized duty round. One cartridge casing from a round of Department-authorized ammunition was also recovered. The total recovery of the seven live rounds, along with the single cartridge casing, indicated that Officer Sampson's pistol was not loaded to capacity with only a total of eight rounds. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Tactical De-Escalation

Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- *Planning*
- *Assessment*
- *Time*
- *Redeployment and/or Containment*
- *Other Resources*
- *Lines of Communication (Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, October 2016, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques)*

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

In this case, Officer Sampson was off-duty, inside of his residence, at the time of this incident and he was not engaged in any tactical operations; therefore, Officer Sampson was not evaluated for Tactical De-escalation.

Command and Control

Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (LAPD, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

While waiting for emergency personnel to arrive, Officer Sampson called Van Nuys Watch Commander Lieutenant Martinez and advised him of the NTUD. Lieutenant Martinez advised Officer Sampson that someone was being sent out to investigate and Lieutenant Martinez made the appropriate notifications.

Lieutenant Martinez and Detective Briscoe responded to the incident together and located Officer Sampson where he was being treated at the hospital. Lieutenant Martinez assumed command and control of the incident and was the Incident Commander.

Officer Sampson had extensive surgery to repair the injuries he sustained during the incident. He was sedated and unable to effectively communicate in a coherent manner with either supervisor

at scene. Because of these circumstances, a PSS was not obtained. Officer Sampson remained separated and monitored at the hospital by Lieutenant Martinez and Detective Briscoe until FID personnel arrived to conduct their investigation; however, neither the Watch Commander's Daily Report nor a Sergeant's Daily Report indicated as such.

Overall, the actions of Lieutenant Martinez and Detective Briscoe were consistent with Department supervisory training and met my expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, I will direct Officer Sampson to attend a Tactical Debrief that shall include discussions pertaining to the above Debriefing Topics along with the following mandatory topics:

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

On May 9, 2019, Officer Sampson attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered, including Firearm Manipulations.

Unintentional Discharge

Firearms safety is critical. Officers must have the ability to draw, holster and manipulate weapons safely at all times, especially under stressful conditions. Firearms safety rules have been established based upon real life situations and are applicable at all times. Violations of any of the safety rules will not be tolerated.

The Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules

- 1. All guns are always loaded.*
- 2. Never allow the muzzle to cover anything you are not willing to shoot.*

3. *Keep your finger off the trigger until your sights are aligned on the target and you intend to shoot.*
4. *Be sure of your target.*

Officers are required to know and apply the Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules throughout their careers. These rules must be ingrained into an officer's natural thought process and become second nature. Any violation of the Four Basic Firearm Safety Rules may result in the unintentional discharge of a round. This is a serious matter with the potential of having tragic results. For administrative purposes, the unintended discharge of a weapon is classified into two categories:

1. *Accidental discharge: An unintended discharge of a firearm as a result of a mechanical malfunction of the firearm, not involving the shooter.*
2. *Negligent discharge: An unintended discharge of a firearm as a result of a shooter not handling a weapon in a safe manner, violating one or more of the four basic firearm safety rules (Los Angeles Police Department Firearms Manual, July 2015).*

Administrative Disapproval - Negligent Discharge. *Finding where it was determined that the unintentional discharge of a firearm resulted from operator error, such as the violation of a firearm safety rule (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

Officer Sampson – 9mm pistol, one round in a westerly direction.

Officer Sampson was going to put his pistol away and attempted to remove the pistol from his right-side pants pocket while he was sitting in the recliner chair. He leaned back, lifted and stretched his left leg out, and reached into his pocket using his right hand to remove the pistol. As Officer Sampson began to remove the pistol from his pocket, he pulled the trigger, unintentionally striking himself in the left leg, resulting in a NTUD. Officer Sampson believed he had placed his finger on the pistol's trigger due to a lack of respect for the weapon and not being focused. Officer Sampson acknowledged he was at fault and felt it was something that could have been prevented. Officer Sampson did not believe that there was a malfunction of the pistol.

Officer Sampson recalled,

I was sitting in the recliner chair. I had -- I was probably finished eating already, and I realized I had my gun inside my pocket still. At that point, I reached into my right-side pocket. I leaned back in the recliner. My leg was sticking up in such a manner, and I reached up. Once I pulled the gun out of my pocket, that's when I pulled the trigger, unintentionally striking myself in the left leg.⁹

I don't believe there was a malfunction of any sort with my weapon. I believe it was just a mistake I made. All -- it was on my -- on my part just not being cautious.¹⁰

⁹ Officer Sampson, Page 5, lines 13-20

¹⁰ Officer Sampson, Page 15, lines 2-5

When asked by FID investigators on why Officer Sampson placed his finger on the trigger, Officer Sampson responded:

DETECTIVE FARIAS: *Can you explain to us why your finger was on the trigger?*

OFFICER SAMPSON: *Just a lack of respect for the weapon. Just not being focused. It was definitely my fault. Definitely something that could have been prevented.*¹¹

The UOFRB conducted a thorough review in evaluating the circumstances and evidence related to the NTUD. The UOFRB opined that although Officer Sampson was conscious of safety and stored his pistol in a lockbox to prevent unauthorized access, he did not carry the pistol in a safe manner, placing it into his pocket along with numerous other items. The UOFRB noted that the FID investigation indicated that there was no evidence of alcohol consumption by Officer Sampson prior to the NTUD, which may have caused him to be careless. The UOFRB also noted that Officer Sampson took full responsibility of the incident during his interview with FID investigators. The UOFRB determined that the NTUD was the result of operator error. Officer Sampson pulled his unholstered pistol from his pants pocket and while doing so, placed his finger on the trigger and discharged a round.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and I concur, that Officer Sampson's action violated the Department's Basic Firearm Safety Rules, and therefore requires a finding of Administrative Disapproval (AD), Negligent Discharge. I will direct that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional

Protocols Subsequent to a Categorical Use of Force Incident - The FID investigation revealed that a separate Sergeant's Daily Report from Detective Briscoe detailing the supervisor's response to the scene was not located. Also, the Van Nuys Area Watch Commander's Daily Report, completed by Lieutenant Martinez, did not indicate a supervisor's response, nor the separation and monitoring of Officer Sampson. Captain Chandler is addressing this through the creation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI), informal counseling and the issuance of a Comment Card. The Commanding Officer of Operations – Valley Bureau (OVV) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, I deem no further action is necessary.

Employment Status - Officer Sampson resigned from the Department effective August 8, 2019.

¹¹ Officer Sampson, Page 27, lines 23-25, Page 28, line 1

Audio/Video Recordings

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)/Body Worn Video (BWV) – Officer Sampson's NTUD occurred while he was off-duty; therefore, no DICVS or BWV were deployed or activated during this incident.

Outside Video – No outside video surveillance captured the incident.

Chief's Direction

In order to enhance the future performance of Department personnel, I have directed the Commanding Officer of Personnel and Training Bureau (PTB) to work in coordination with the Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy (OCPD) to clarify the Department's policy as it pertains to the requirement for an officer to secure an off-duty firearm in a holster or other secure manner when carrying the firearm. The Department's loading standards related to the loading of Department-approved ammunition to the full capacity of the firearm, specifically as they pertain to off-duty firearms, is to also be clarified. Department personnel are to be reminded of these requirements.¹²

Respectfully,



MICHEL R. MOORE
Chief of Police

Date: _____

2-6-20

¹² Officer Sampson resigned from the Department effective August 8, 2019.

INC No. 014-19	CF No.	DR No. 19-9915789
OIS - NT Unintentional Discharge		

Location of Incident 2401 South Hacienda Heights, Apt. 20	RD 9999	Date of Incident April 16, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review January 13, 2020 1230 Hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members:		
Member (Office Representative) Commander M. Rimkunas, Serial No. 32211			
Member (Police Sciences and Training Bureau) Commander M. Baeza, Serial No. 26624			
Member (Bureau) Deputy Chief J. Rodriguez, Serial No. 25668			
Member (Peer) Officer B. Swaim, Serial No. 36871			
Presenting Commanding Officer Captain O. Chandler, Serial No. 26288			
Notes: BOPC:			
Additional Considerations:			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
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<div style="text-align: right;"> COP Date Signed: 2/6/20 PC Date Submitted: 2/6/20 </div>			

Employee (Last Name, First, Middle) Sampson, Walter		Serial No. 43662	Rank/Class Police Officer I	Incident No. 014-19
Length of Employment 0 years, 8 months	Current Division Resigned		Time in Current Division 0 years, 2 months	

Use of Force Review Board	Chief of Police	Police Commission
<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval	<u>Tactics</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Tactical Debrief <input type="checkbox"/> Administrative Disapproval
<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Drawing and Exhibiting the Firearm</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)
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<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Unintentional Discharge</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> Accidental <input type="checkbox"/> Negligent (Administrative Disapproval)
<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)	<u>Other Issues</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Does Not Apply <input type="checkbox"/> In Policy (No Further Action) <input type="checkbox"/> Out of Policy (Administrative Disapproval)

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SGT. S. TORRES


<u>Final Adjudication for Out of Policy/ Administrative Disapproval Finding</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Extensive Retraining <input type="checkbox"/> Notice to Correct Deficiencies <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Complaint <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Employee's Work History Reviewed	Notes: OFFICER RESIGNED WHILE ON PROBATION
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*A Tactical Debrief shall be conducted for all Categorical Use of Force Incidents.

LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REVIEW BOARD REPORT

INC No. 014-19	CF No.	DR No. 19-9915789
OIS - NT Unintentional Discharge		

REVIEW BOARD INFORMATION

Location of Incident 2401 South Hacienda Heights, Apt. 20	RD 9999	Date of Incident April 16, 2019	Date and Time of Board Review January 13, 2020 1230 Hours
Chair Assistant Chief B. Girmala, Serial No. 24916	Signature of Approving Board Members:		
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Presenting Commanding Officer Captain O. Chandler, Serial No. 26288			
Notes: BOPC <div style="text-align: right;">SGT. STORRES #32569</div>			
Additional Considerations:			
Modification to Present Policy, Practices or Training:			
<div style="text-align: right;"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COP Date Signed: 2/6/20 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PC Date Submitted: 2/6/20 </div>			

